Through Gritted Teeth and Clenched Jaw: Court-Initiated Sanctions in Bankruptcy Opinions by Rapoport, Nancy B.
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
2010 
Through Gritted Teeth and Clenched Jaw: Court-Initiated 
Sanctions in Bankruptcy Opinions 
Nancy B. Rapoport 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Rapoport, Nancy B., "Through Gritted Teeth and Clenched Jaw: Court-Initiated Sanctions in Bankruptcy 
Opinions" (2010). Scholarly Works. 16. 
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/16 
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered 




THROUGH GRITTED TEETH AND CLENCHED JAW:   
COURT-INITIATED SANCTIONS OPINIONS IN   
BANKRUPTCY COURTS! 
NANCY B. RAPOPORT!! 
   
 I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702 
 II. “Wicked Child” Opinions (Ignoring the Rules) . . . . . . . . 707 
 III. “Unmindful Child” Opinions (Unaware of the Rules) . . 713 
 IV. “Warning Shot” Opinions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 716 
 V. “I Don’t Understand Bankruptcy Law” Reversals. . . . . . 723 
 VI. “What the Hey?” Reversals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725 
 VII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729 
 
! This Essay was solicited for the Ninth Annual Symposium on Legal Malpractice 
and Professional Responsibility.  I owe special thanks to my friend Professor Colin Marks 
for getting me involved in this symposium, as well as to Peter Bayer, Jeff Bohm, Kelli 
Bonds, Jennifer Gross, Michael Lynn, Nettie Mann, Randall Newsome, Morris Rapoport, 
Wesley Steen, Jeff Van Niel, and Gregg Zive. 
!! Gordon Silver Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas. 
 
702 ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:701 
 
 
I.     INTRODUCTION 
I’m a former Chapter 11 bankruptcy lawyer, and I study the 
behavior of lawyers in Chapter 11 cases.  As such, I’m lucky 
enough not to have encountered too many bad1 or incompetent2 
lawyers, either in practice or in my research, but I know that 
they’re out there. 
So do bankruptcy courts.  These courts see more bad and 
incompetent lawyers than they’d wish to see,3 and they have only a 
few options for dealing with problem lawyers.  A court could 
punish a bad lawyer by finding a procedural or substantive 
irregularity in the lawyer’s pleadings, but that choice also penalizes 
the lawyer’s client, who may have chosen the lawyer by 
happenstance.  A court could rule against the lawyer, choosing not 
to believe the lawyer—an application of the “fool me once, shame 
on you; fool me twice, shame on me” theory.  Again, though, that 
strategy punishes the lawyer’s client, who might be an innocent 
bystander.  Alternatively, nothing stops a judge from giving a bad 
 
1. By “bad,” I mean lawyers who behave in ways that subvert the legal system;  
lawyers who are malicious for the sake of maliciousness.  Lawyers are not supposed to, 
among other things, torment third parties.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
4.4 (2009) (stating that a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other 
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person).  In addition, lawyers should not lie to 
the opposing side or obstruct its access to evidence. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2009) (stating that a lawyer shall not unlawfully obstruct another party’s 
access to evidence and shall not falsify evidence or assist a witness to testify falsely).  Also, 
lawyers should not lie to the court.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 
(2009) (stating that a lawyer shall not make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal).  
Finally, lawyers should not behave dishonestly.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 8.4 (2009) (stating that it’s professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 
2. Lawyers who are incompetent just flat-out don’t know what they are doing.  See  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009) (declaring that a lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client).  Sometimes, even competent lawyers are not 
diligent, often because they are overworked.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.3 (2009) (stating that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client).  However, just because the pace of work is often crushingly hard, 
that does not excuse lawyers from the basics of diligence, such as returning clients’ phone 
calls and emails and from filing pleadings on time. 
3. For a recent scandal, see Mark Hamblett, Former Mayer Brown Partner Gets 7 
Years for Refco Fraud, 241 N.Y. L.J. 11 (2010), available at 2010 WLNR 1116436, for a 
description of the conviction and sentencing of a lawyer who defrauded investors out of 
$2.4 million, enriching his own firm in the process. 
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lawyer a dressing-down in court.  The transcript would reveal that 
the court was unhappy with the lawyer’s performance, but unless 
someone else ordered a copy of the transcript, no particular 
ramifications would come of that dressing-down.  (My educated 
guess is that most misbehavior in court gets the dressing-down 
treatment, as a court’s way of enforcing norms quickly and 
efficiently.) 
In addition, a court could decide to hand down a sanctions 
opinion, either because one party requests that the court consider 
sanctions or because the court, on its own motion, believes that a 
lawyer’s behavior is serious enough to merit a written order.  In 
this Essay, I address that subset of sanctions opinions that arise 
from this latter alternative: when a court, on its own motion, 
decides to discipline a lawyer for serious misbehavior. 
I will explore the types of behavior that trigger court-initiated 
sanctions opinions and what happens to some of these opinions on 
appeal.  Based on my non-exhaustive review of court-initiated 
sanctions orders, I believe that most of these orders are written 
after the lawyer in question has stepped so far over the line of 
“reasonable lawyer behavior” that he can’t even see “reasonable 
behavior” in his rear-view mirror.4  Some of these sanctions orders 
will cover one-shot mistakes that the lawyer—had he or she been 
thinking clearly—would have realized were genuinely awful things 
to do.  Other sanctions orders will discuss cumulative egregious 
misbehavior by lawyers.5  On appeal, the treatment of these court-
initiated sanctions orders tend to fall into the categories of “good 
point but bad procedure” remands or reversals, “I don’t 
understand bankruptcy law” remands or reversals, or orders 
affirming the bankruptcy court’s sanctions order. 
There are countless ways to organize these cases, but because 
 
4. Cf. JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993) (depicting a scene in which a 
Tyrannosaurus rex is chasing a car and appears in the car’s side-view mirror above the 
warning, “Objects in mirror are closer than they appear”). 
5. Most ethics rules require a lawyer who witnesses misconduct to report that 
conduct to the state bar.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2009) (stating 
that if a lawyer knows of another lawyer who has committed a violation of the Model 
Rules and has questionable honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness, she should inform the 
appropriate authorities).  Yet, it seems as if lawyers who sit in court watching their 
colleagues step way over the ethical line often forget their own duty to report.  Cf. Joel 
Cohen & Katherine A. Helm, A New Year’s Resolution for Lawyers, Jan. 4, 2010, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202437340930 (suggesting lawyers have a collective 
obligation to keep the profession responsible and ethical). 
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this Symposium issue is likely to go to print around the time of 
Passover, I’m going to organize the cases around the theme of the 
“four children” (originally known as the “four sons”),6 a classic 
component of the Passover Seder.  Shortly after the youngest child 
at the Seder asks the Four Questions,7 initiating the retelling of 
the Passover story, there is a segment of the Seder at which four 
different children ask, in essence, why are we going through this 
whole rigamarole?  There’s a wise child, a wicked child, a simple 
(untutored) child, and a child who doesn’t even know to ask.8  
(Yes, if you’re paying attention, there are three children asking 
and one child for whom we’re voluntarily telling the story.) 
For the wise child, we retell the facts of Passover, and not just 
the laws associated with it, because facts are important to the 
understanding of why we celebrate the holiday—a mere under-
standing of the rules, without an understanding of the facts giving 
rise to the rules, cheats us (and the child) of the richness of the 
 
6. See, e.g., Dovid Gottlieb, The Four Sons, http://ohr.edu/yhiy/article.php/805 (last 
visited May 11, 2010) (analyzing who exactly the four sons really are).  Here is a version of 
the “four sons” part of the Seder:  
The Torah spoke about four sons, one wise, one wicked, one simple and one who 
cannot formulate a question.  
What does the wise son say?  “What do the testimonies, and the statutes, and the 
judgments, mean, which Hashem our God has commanded you?”  You should also 
say to him the laws of the [Korban] Pesach, [up to the law] that we do not eat any 
dessert after the Pesach.  
What does the wicked son say?  “What does this Avodah (worship) mean Lakhem 
(to you)[?]” “To you” [meaning] and “not to him[.]”  Since he excluded himself from 
the community, he has denied the basic principle.  You should also set his teeth on 
edge and say to him: “It is on account of this that Hashem did for me when I left 
Egypt” “for me” and not “for him”— had he been there, he would not have been 
redeemed.  
What does the simple son say?  “What is this?”  “[T]hat you shall say to him, By 
strength of hand Hashem brought us out from Egypt, from the house of slavery;”  
Regarding the one who cannot formulate a question, you must open up the 
discussion, as it says:  “And you shall tell your son in that day, saying, This is done 
because of that which Hashem did to me when I came forth out of Egypt.”  
Yitzchak Etshalom, Haggadah Shel Pesach (II): The “Four Sons,” http://www.torah.org/ 
advanced/mikra/5757/va/dt.60.3.04.html (last visited May 11, 2010). 
7. See, e.g., Tracey R. Rich, Pesach Seder: How Is This Night Different?, 
http://www.jewfaq.org/seder.htm (last visited May 11, 2010) (explaining how the youngest 
person at the table usually asks, “Why is this night different from all other nights?” in an 
attempt to understand the Seder). 
8. Dovid Gottlieb, The Four Sons, http://ohr.edu/yhiy/article.php/805 (last visited 
May 11, 2010). 
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story.9  For the wicked child, who wants to know what Passover 
means to everyone else at the table, but not to him, we’re 
supposed to relate an understanding of what it means to be in the 
group that is affected by, and follows, the rules.10  Because the 
wicked child has deliberately excluded himself from the group, 
we’re supposed to exclude him from that same group in the 
retelling.11  For the untutored child, we’re supposed to help her 
understand the story, perhaps not at the same level of 
sophistication that the wise child would understand it, but to the 
best of her ability to understand.12  For the child who doesn’t 
know to ask, we begin the retelling without needing to be 
prompted at all.13 
How does this analogy14 play out when reading bankruptcy 
sanctions opinions?  The lawyers who don’t get into trouble are 
like the “wise child”—they “get” the ethics rules, and so perhaps 
they read sanctions opinions, if at all, to make sure that they don’t 
run afoul of anything unusual.  My guess is that most good 
attorneys don’t spend a lot of time reading sanctions opinions 
unless they happen to know the lawyer(s) involved. 
The lawyers who do get into trouble will fall into one of two 
camps: the “wicked child” or the “child who doesn’t know to ask.”  
The “wicked child” thinks that the rules don’t apply to him, while 
 
9. See Tracey R. Rich, Pesach Seder: How Is This Night Different?, http://www.jew 
faq.org/seder.htm (last visited May 11, 2010) (discussing how the Haggadah deliberately 
provokes young children to question the rituals of the Pesach Seder in order to 
differentiate it from other holidays). 
10. Dovid Gottlieb, The Four Sons, http://ohr.edu/yhiy/article.php/805 (last visited 
May 11, 2010). 
11. See id. (stating the wicked son is excluded from the retelling because he is too 
proud and that discussing the story with him is pointless). 
12. See id. (explaining that the simple son’s questioning lacks sophistication but 
shows a sincere desire to learn and understand). 
13. See id. (stating that the son who does not know how to ask lacks cleverness and 
therefore remains silent). 
14. There are other analogies at play here.  For example, as I was coming up with the 
title for this essay, I kept hearing, in the back of my mind, another theme in the Seder:  
“The Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand and outstretched arm, with great 
awe, miraculous signs and wonders.”  See, e.g., Barry Dov Lerner, Jewish Family 
Education Passover Haggadah: A Complete Haggadah, Feb. 21, 2010, http://www.jewish 
freeware.org/downloads/folder.2006-01-07.0640323187/5770COMPLETEMASTERHagga 
dahPaginated3-8-10WITHOUT%20SONGS.pdf (alterations in original) (quoting Deuter-
onomy 26:8).  Maybe a judge’s gritted teeth and clenched jaw is not the Almighty’s mighty 
hand and outstretched arm (OK, it’s not even close), but I’m trying to convey a feeling of 
powerfulness here. 
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the “child who doesn’t ask” doesn’t even know what he doesn’t 
know.  I tend to write for those who know the rules and just need 
some support for what they want to say (the “wise child” lawyers) 
or for those who have an idea of what’s right and wrong but who 
need some help getting through the steps (the “simple child” 
lawyers).  Judges who write sanctions opinions are writing for the 
“wicked child” or the “child who does not know to ask.” 
When judges write sanctions opinions, they’re writing them after 
very long days, and they’re writing them very carefully.  After all, 
if a lawyer is on the wrong side of a court-initiated sanctions 
opinion and decides to appeal, the lawyer gets to write a brief, 
designate the record, and argue the appeal.  The judge who wrote 
the sua sponte sanctions opinion, however, only stands on the 
opinion—there is no advocate automatically arguing for the 
judge’s view of what happened.15  It’s not an accident, then, that 
these opinions are among the most meticulously crafted that I’ve 
read; it’s the judge’s only shot at explaining the rationale for 
initiating the sanction.  If the judge doesn’t do a good job of 
explaining why the sanction was necessary (and assuming that the 
sanction was necessary), then the opinion will be reversed on 
appeal, and the misbehaving lawyer will learn nothing from the 
experience.16 
Due to the serious nature of sanctions opinions, judges also tend 
to be careful in the problems that they’re addressing.  The signif-
icant ethics breaches that a court might describe in a sanctions 
opinion could trigger state bar disciplinary proceedings.  Keeping 
this synergy in mind, the judge must provide a careful record of the 
lawyer’s transgressions.17  I have never found a judge who looked 
 
15. See generally Greenfield v. First City Bancorporation of Tex., Inc. (In re First 
City Bancorporation of Tex., Inc.), 270 B.R. 807 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (explaining the standard 
of review for a bankruptcy opinion), aff’d, 282 F.3d 864 (5th Cir. 2002). 
16. Worse yet, the misbehaving lawyer may well discover that whatever he did is 
worth more to him (e.g., charging clients for incompetent advice, representing multiple 
clients with clear conflicts of interest, or allowing a client’s ire to run roughshod over a 
non-client) than any potential punishment his misbehavior might cost him.  Cf. id. at 809–
10 (detailing the actions that led the bankruptcy court to impose sanctions, and noting that 
lesser sanctions had failed to have an effect on the defendant’s behavior). 
17. See Susan M. Freeman, Ethical Dilemmas—How to Avoid Them (Sorry Counsel, 
You Signed It: Ethics Rule 9011, and Inadequate Filings), 8TH ANN. ROCKY MTN. BANKR. 
CONF. § VI (2003) (“The bankruptcy court or appellate court may refer its sanctions 
determination to the state professional disciplinary authority, commencing a state 
disciplinary process.”); see also In re Fahey, No. 09-00501, 2009 WL 2855728, at *1 (Bankr. 
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forward to writing a sanctions opinion.  There are many parts of a 
judge’s day that can be challenging and some that can be 
satisfying, but no judge enjoys having to sanction a bad lawyer. 
II.     “WICKED CHILD” OPINIONS (IGNORING THE RULES) 
If a lawyer wants to set a judge’s teeth on edge, the fastest way 
to do that is to flout the law—either bankruptcy law or the ethics 
rules.  In re Fahey18 is a great example of a court sanctioning a 
lawyer whose exploits were so bad that they were actually 
statistically significant.19 
In In re Fahey, the bankruptcy court opened a miscellaneous 
matter to consider whether or not the sanctioned lawyer should be 
disciplined for:  
a clear and consistent pattern of (1) failure to file information 
required by Bankruptcy Code § 521 when he files petitions 
commencing cases under the Bankruptcy Code, (ii) inadequate 
representation of clients, (iii) lack of expertise in bankruptcy law, 
(iv) unreasonable delegation of authority and responsibility to a 
contract paralegal that resulted in substantial harm to bankruptcy 
debtors, (v) filing pleadings containing false statements, and (vi) 
failure to comply with the Bankruptcy Code, Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP), and local rules.20  
In arriving at the reasonable conclusion that the lawyer’s 
behavior was egregious, the court reviewed three years of Chapter 
13 cases that the lawyer had filed and compared his results with 







S.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2009) (“The Court will also forward this memorandum . . . to the State 
Bar of Texas for such disciplinary action as they might deem appropriate.”). 
18. In re Fahey, No. 09-00501, 2009 WL 2855728 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2009). 
19. See id. at *1–3 (reviewing defendant’s case history before the bankruptcy court 
and providing statistical breakdowns of the percentage of dismissed cases that were the 
result of his mistakes). 
20. Id. at *1. 
21. Id. at *2–3. 
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 Mr. Fahey Other Attorneys 
Number of Chapter 13 Cases 
Filed 1/1/2006 to 3/31/2009 62 226 
% of cases that were dismissed 92% 28% 
% of cases dismissed for failure to 
file § 521 information 47% 2% 
% of cases dismissed within 90 
days after petition was filed 61% 6% 
  22 
The Chapter 13 trustee in Laredo, where the sanctioned 
lawyer’s cases were based, conducted an independent analysis that 
confirmed the court’s findings.23  The United States Trustee also 
reviewed the sanctioned lawyer’s results in the lawyer’s Chapter 7 
and Chapter 11 filings, with similar results.24  As if the results were 
not reason enough to call for sanctions,25 the sanctioned lawyer 
admitted to the court that none of his petitions actually had his 
clients’ signatures.26  Because the lawyer had ignored warnings 
about his behavior in prior cases, the court banned the lawyer 
from practicing bankruptcy law until the lawyer could demonstrate 
that he knew what he was doing in bankruptcy cases.  In addition, 
the court referred the lawyer for further discipline by the district 
court and the State Bar of Texas.27 
Willful ignorance of the practice of bankruptcy law is one thing.  
The failure to abide by the rules of common decency and the 
basics of professionalism is quite another.  In In re Martinez,28 the 
bankruptcy court sanctioned a creditor’s lawyers—and the creditor 
itself—for insisting that a scrivener’s error be enforced as filed.29 
The debtors in the case had three houses, and Wells Fargo Bank 
 
22. Id. at *2. 
23. See In re Fahey, 2009 WL 2855728, at *2–3 (summarizing the independent 
analysis conducted by the Chapter 13 trustee). 
24. Id. at *3–4. 
25. In keeping with my Passover theme, Dayenu (Hebrew for, in essence, “that 
would have been enough”).  GreatJewishMusic.com, Learn to Sing Dayenu, http://www.gr 
eatjewishmusic.com/Midifiles/Passover/Dayenu.htm (last visited May 11, 2010) (providing 
the translation of Dayenu). 
26. In re Fahey, 2009 WL 2855728, at *5. 
27. Id. at *1. 
28. In re Martinez, 393 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2008). 
29. Id. at 41–42. 
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had several liens on all of the houses.30  The debtors agreed to 
stipulate to relief from stay on one of the houses—a house in 
which they weren’t living.31  Although both sides (the bank’s law-
yers and the debtors’ lawyer) thought that the house, which was 
the subject of the stipulation, was one of two other houses that the 
debtors were voluntarily surrendering, the legal description of the 
house in the stay relief stipulation was actually the one house that 
the debtors did not want to surrender.32  Here’s what happened 
next:  
When the mistake was pointed out to the lawyer from [Wells 
Fargo’s outside law firm], he ultimately acknowledged it.  When 
asked to sign a stipulation vacating the order on the mistaken 
stipulation, the lawyer refused.  He claimed that his client, Wells 
Fargo, would not consent to vacating the mistaken stipulation.  As a 
result, on March 17, the debtors sought an order shortening time for 
the court to hear a motion to vacate the stipulation.  The reason 
shortened time was requested was simple: if Wells Fargo would not 
consent to vacating the mistaken stipulation, then Wells Fargo 
presumably intended to take advantage of the mistake and foreclose 
on the debtors[’] residence.  The court agreed to hear the motion on 
March 24.  
[Wells Fargo’s outside law firm] did not oppose the debtors’ 
request for a hearing on shortened time.  Despite being ordered to 
file a written response, it did not do so.  A lawyer from [Wells 
Fargo’s outside law firm] did, however, appear at the hearing.  His 
appearance consisted primarily of his statement that his client, Wells 
Fargo, would not allow him to consent to vacate the stipulation.  
After hearing the evidence, the court vacated the order on the 
stipulation.  It then issued an order to show cause why the lawyer 
from [Wells Fargo’s outside law firm], the [outside] law firm [itself], 
and Wells Fargo should not be sanctioned for their individual and 
collective conduct in refusing to aid the debtors in rectifying the 
admitted mistake.33  
To borrow a phrase from humorist Dave Barry,34 “I am not 
 
30. Id. at 30. 
31. Id. at 30–31. 
32. Id. at 31. 
33. In re Martinez, 393 B.R. at 31. 
34. See Dave Barry—Biography, http://www.davebarry.com/about.html (last visited 
May 11, 2010) (“Dave Barry is a humor columnist.  For twenty-five years he was a 
syndicated columnist whose work appeared in more than 500 newspapers in the United 
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making this up”: lawyers for Wells Fargo preferred to force a hear-
ing to fix a scrivener’s error rather than tell their client that its 
refusal to put the correct legal description of the house into an 
amended stipulation was outrageous.35  In an opinion that span-
ned everything from contract law (why the lawyers could have 
reformed the stipulation) to bankruptcy rules (Rule 9011) to ethics 
rules, the court explained just how awful the lawyers’ behavior had 
been:  
Clients may not demand unethical or unlawful conduct from their 
lawyers and expect compliance.  As established above, [Wells 
Fargo’s outside law firm] and its lawyers knew, or should have 
known, that Wells Fargo had no reasonable or nonfrivolous basis to 
oppose setting aside the stipulation.  At a minimum, they had a duty 
to tell this to Wells Fargo, and to withdraw from the representation 
or take some other action if Wells Fargo insisted on opposing.  They 
neither withdrew nor did they offer any evidence of compliance with 
Rule 1.4.  
The court understands that lawyers do not give away their services, 
and that good business and good lawyering each require that the 
lawyer serve the client’s business needs.  But law is a profession as 
well as a business.  Because of this status, lawyers must not allow the 
interests or dictates of a client to control their professional 
judgment. . . .  
This court is concerned that [Wells Fargo’s outside law firm] and 
its lawyers sacrificed their professional independence to the 
demands of a large institutional client.  They should have counseled 
Wells Fargo to agree to vacate the mistaken stipulation, and 
informed them that any other course of conduct was unreasonable 
and one in which they could not participate.  Instead, they followed 
Wells Fargo’s instructions without apparent regard to their 
professional obligations.  In short, rather than remain as 
independent professionals counseling Wells Fargo, [Wells Fargo’s 
outside law firm] and its lawyers instead chose to become 
unthinking agents for Wells Fargo’s ends.  
The smooth functioning of the courts and the interests of justice 
always trump a client’s unreasonable demands.36 
 
States and abroad.”). 
35. See In re Martinez, 393 B.R. at 34 (explaining that Wells Fargo’s outside law firm 
and its lawyers chose to follow Wells Fargo’s orders, despite knowing they were without 
basis). 
36. Id. at 36–37 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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So far, the “wicked child” cases involve lawyers who are 
stubbornly incompetent in their practice of bankruptcy law and 
lawyers who persist in furthering their clients’ unreasonable 
demands.  Sometimes, though, the “wicked child” case will involve 
some wildly temperamental lawyer behavior.  In Greenfield v. First 
City Bancorporation of Texas, Inc. (In re First City Bancorporation 
of Texas, Inc.),37 the sanctioned lawyer was accused, among other 
things, of:  
•  characterizing other attorneys, including an Assistant United 
States Attorney, as “stooges,” “puppet,” a “weak pussyfooting 
‘deadhead’” who “had been ‘dead’ mentally for ten years,” “various 
incompetents,” “inept,” “clunks,” “falling all over themselves, 
wasting endless hours,” “a bunch of starving slobs,” an “underling” 
who graduated from a 29th-tier law school, and “in mortal fear of 
taking a lie detector test”; 
•  calling the chairman of First City a “hayseed” and “washed-up 
has been” and other directors “scoundrels”; 
•  referring to attorneys as having been fired by their former firms; 
. . .
•  referring to the work of other attorneys as “garbage,” 
demonstrating “legal incompetence,” and involving “ludicrous 
additional time and expenses”; . . . 
•  alleging fraud, cover-ups, payoffs, and bribes with (apparently) 
little if any evidence to support the characterizations; and 
•  referring to extraneous and prejudicial matters, such as a 
“scandal” at a Houston hospital that was another client of one of the 
opposing attorneys.38  
Although the bankruptcy court had tried a variety of other 
sanctions to “curb . . . [the lawyer’s] contumacious conduct,”39 
none of those sanctions seemed to work.40  The lawyer eventually 
appealed the order of significant monetary sanctions, and the 
district court affirmed.41 
The lawyer’s arguments on appeal had chutzpah: his statements 
 
37. Greenfield v. First City Bancorporation of Tex., Inc. (In re First City 
Bancorporation of Tex., Inc.), 270 B.R. 807 (N.D. Tex. 2001), aff’d, 282 F.3d 864 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
38. Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. (noting that the bankruptcy court had imposed “lesser sanctions” such as 
“oral and written admonitions and warnings,” to no avail). 
41. Id. at 807–08. 
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were true; he had seen worse behavior pass without sanction; his 
tactics were effective; the recipients of his remarks had, in essence, 
asked for it; and the judge had made plenty of other bad 
decisions.42  Nice try, but no cigar.  The district court observed 
that the Northern District of Texas had set forth certain standards 
of conduct for litigators, and that this lawyer’s behavior fell well 
below those standards:  
If anything, Appellants’ brief provides further evidence of 
Greenfield’s inability to conform to the standards expected in this 
district.  In the briefs, he emphasizes that an opposing attorney 
attended Brooklyn Law School (Greenfield graduated from 
Harvard Law School) and offers the two schools’ respective 
rankings by U.S. News & World Report, apparently as evidence that 
the other attorney is inferior in support of Greenfield’s statement 
that the lawyer had been fired by another law firm.  He also brings 
up what he characterizes as errors by the bankruptcy judge in other 
rulings, apparently as evidence that the judge’s conclusions as to 
evidence are untrustworthy.  Both of these remarks are arguably 
additional violations of the Dondi standards.43  
With an aside that the lawyer might want to consider an anger 
management course, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy 
court’s sanctions order.44 
My guess is that not all outbursts come from lawyers with anger 
issues.  Some outbursts may well come from the fact that 
bankruptcy lawyers have ample opportunity to interact with 
bankruptcy judges at meetings, CLEs, and conferences—in 
addition to any cases in which they interact—and sometimes that 
familiarity can bring contempt.45  Even a well-regarded lawyer can 
 
42. See In re First City, 270 B.R. at 812 (describing improper sanctions arguments). 
43. Id. at 813–14.  The court, citing to Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc), listed some of the standards that 
lawyers are expected to follow.  In re First City, 270 B.R. at 812. 
44. Id. at 814. 
45. Take the famous “few French fries short of a Happy Meal” comment that one 
bankruptcy lawyer made to a bankruptcy judge during a hearing.  See Posting of Ronald 
V. Miller, Jr. to The Maryland Injury Lawyer Blog,  A Few French Fries Short of a Happy 
Meal, http://www.marylandinjurylawyerblog.com/2007/05/a_few_french_fries_short_of_a 
_happy_meal.html (May 29, 2007) (noting a comment made by a lawyer to a judge in a 
bankruptcy court and its possible consequences).  As this blog pointed out:  
“I suggest to you with respect, Your Honor, that you’re a few French fries short of a 
Happy Meal in terms of what’s likely to take place.”  This is probably directed to the 
way the details of the bankruptcy plan would unfold.  Moreover, although she later 
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find himself facing an order to show cause for treating the judge 
with too much informality, although garden-variety informality 
likely will not trigger an order to show cause. 
What can we learn from “wicked child” situations?  We can 
conclude that, eventually, a lawyer’s repeated misbehavior can be 
so clearly beyond the pale that even the most patient of judges will 
say, “Enough.” 
III.     “UNMINDFUL CHILD” OPINIONS (UNAWARE OF THE RULES) 
It’s not just experienced lawyers who can anger a court to the 
point where the court takes the time to write a lengthy sanctions 
opinion.  Bankruptcy novices—at least those who clearly have not 
taken the time to learn the fundamentals of bankruptcy practice 
and policy—can find themselves on the wrong end of a sanctions 
opinion as well. 
In re Aston-Nevada46 is a good example.  Bankruptcy cases are 
supposed to be collective actions, designed to bring all of the 
debtor’s creditors together in one forum to determine equitable 
treatment.  Therefore, a bankruptcy case that is a one-creditor, 
one-debtor dispute is typically not an appropriate use of the 
Bankruptcy Code’s collective treatment.  Lawyers for debtor 
Aston-Nevada either didn’t understand this fundamental point or 
chose to ignore it when they began their representation of a 
Chapter 11 debtor who had filed for bankruptcy protection on the 
eve of state court litigation.47  The debtor had only one asset: a 
liened-up Porsche.48  The debtor’s lawyers managed to bollix up 
the case in a variety of ways.  For example, they attempted to 
dismiss the case without notice and a hearing, and they sent 
 
su[a] sponte calls for a show cause hearing as to why the lawyer should be permitted 
to continue to practice before her, the judge did not stop the hearing to address the 
issue.  She simply asked counsel to proceed.  Obviously, tone is lost when you are 
reading a transcript.  We have no idea how this really happened.  
 The way to avoid this issue in the first place is for lawyers to bear in mind that there 
is [a] tran[s]cript being generated.  It is also a good idea for lawyers, particularly in 
this kind of venue, to save [their] Jerry Seinfeldlike efforts [for another venue].  For 
every time you get a laugh or someone thinks you a[re] witty, someone else thinks 
you are silly or disrespectful.  For the latter, this is certainly Exhibit A.  
Id. 
46. In re Aston-Nevada Ltd. P’ship, 391 B.R. 84 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006). 
47. Id. at 90. 
48. Id. 
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someone to appear at a Rule 2004 examination who had no 
knowledge regarding the whereabouts of the debtor’s Porsche.49  
Not willing to miss a step, the debtor’s lawyers also filed a 
response to the court’s separate order to show cause regarding 
sanctions against them.50  That response managed to insult the 
judge on several different levels:  
Their joint response, filed April 29, 2005, described the language in 
the court’s prior memorandum as “outlandish, improper, unfounded 
and boorish” as well as “false” and “reckless.”  The court’s 
reasoning was based, [the law firm] asserted, “on flimsy threads of 
inference and guess-work,” and it exceeded the “reason and 
decorum expected of a judicial officer.”  For good measure, [the law 
firm] stated that the prior memorandum was “offensive, distasteful, 
crude, untrue, and should never [have been] issued by any judiciary 
or judicial officer administering equity and justice . . . [.]”51  
Not satisfied with lobbing insults at the court, the debtor’s 
lawyers also threatened to seek judicial discipline.52  At the show-
cause hearing, the court gave the lawyers a chance to retract some 
of their allegations.53  They refused.54  In doing so, they gave new 
meaning to the concept of cluelessness. 
In explaining why the lawyers deserved to be sanctioned for 
their conduct, the court divided the ethics lapses into two 
categories: errors caused by a lawyer’s inexperience in bankruptcy 
practice and errors caused by crossing the line from zealous 
advocacy to bad faith.55  Most troubling about the lawyers’ 
 
49. Id. at 91. 
50. Id. 
51. In re Aston-Nevada, 391 B.R. at 95; see also id. at 95 n.18 (describing the “soft-
footed[ness]” of the court’s prior memorandum regarding sanctions).  I have no idea what 
“soft-footed” means in this context, but it can’t be good. 
52. Id. at 95–96. 
53. Id. at 96. 
54. Id. 
55. In re Aston-Nevada Ltd. P’ship, 391 B.R. 84, 96 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006).  On the 
latter point, the court observed:  
 The court’s refusal to characterize [the law firm’s] and [the individual’s] actions as 
merely hapless is further supported by their collective reaction to the order to show 
cause.  The court considered separately sanctioning the response, since it clearly 
contains inappropriate and sanctionable language, but instead chooses to view it as a 
part of [the law firm’s] and [the individual’s] general approach to litigation, an 
approach that is unacceptable under any reasonable view of modern lawyering.  
Id. at 97. 
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behavior was their failure to use their own legal judgment to 
dissuade their client from impermissible actions:  
[The law firm’s] and [the individual lawyers’] prevarications and 
misstatements were deliberate and not careless.  They were part of a 
concerted effort to delay the inevitable through pettifoggery and 
evasion.  In short, their misrepresentations were designed to mislead 
the court.  For the reasons set forth above, each of them 
independently constitutes a violation of Rule 9011.  
Even if [the law firm] had not affirmatively misled the court, its 
conduct nonetheless violated Rule 9011.  In particular, when [the 
law firm] learned of the meager facts related to Aston-Nevada and 
its filing, it should have declined to file an opposition.  And these 
facts could have (and should have) either come out during the initial 
client consultation or soon thereafter by checking PACER for 
Aston-Nevada’s docket information.  Instead, [the individual 
lawyer] and [the law firm] took the passive approach to client 
representation, that of doing anything and everything the client 
requests, regardless of its questionable nature.  
This a lawyer may not do.56  
In sanctioning the lawyers, the court pinpointed the essence of 
their misbehavior:  
To act on such frivolous claims, then, without independent 
investigation, was to succumb to the so-called “butler-style” of 
representation, under which the sequaciously servile lawyer does 
whatever the client wants and then cites that client’s command as a 
shield to the improper actions.  This style of lawyering, however, has 
no place in bankruptcy court or, for that matter, in any court.57  
When I first read Aston-Nevada, I knew that the court was going 
to come up with some creative sanctions as soon as I saw 
“sequaciously servile.”58  Such a phrase, elegant in its alliteration, 
signals that the court has passed any point of tolerance for 
misbehavior.  And I wasn’t disappointed.  The sanctions included, 
in addition to monetary sanctions: 
• A public reprimand, by virtue of the opinion’s publication;59 
• A requirement that each of the law firm’s attorneys must, before 
 
56. Id. at 102 (footnotes omitted). 
57. Id. at 103. 
58. Id.  The court’s use of “splenetic and threatening” wasn’t bad either.  In re Aston-
Nevada, 391 B.R. at 109. 
59. Id. 
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appearing before the court or filing any document with the court, 
first file a declaration with the following components:  
[T]hat, during the twenty-four months immediately preceding the 
desired filing or appearance, the person has: (A) taken eight hours 
of continuing legal education regarding the practice of bankruptcy; 
(B) taken at least four hours of continuing legal education regarding 
ethics or professional responsibility; and (ii) attaches to the 
declaration, for filing in the case in which the person desires to 
appear, (A) a copy of this opinion; and (B) a copy of the brochure or 
other similar writing indicating the scope of the continuing legal 
education program attended.60  
• Removing from the firm’s website any indication that the firm 
has expertise in bankruptcy law “unless and until at least one 
partner of the firm meets the continuing education requirements 
set forth” in the sanctions order.61 
Who can’t appreciate a sanction that closely tied to the lawyers’ 
misbehavior?  I love this case for its reasoning regarding the 
sanctions:  
The notion that any action requested by a client should be taken so 
long as some argument, no matter how tenuous, can be made for it, 
has a corrosive effect.  If unchecked, it spreads in the form of “tit-
for-tat” reciprocity that lowers the level of practice, and multiplies 
litigation needlessly.62  
In “unmindful child” types of cases, it isn’t that the lawyers 
didn’t know how to say no to their clients.  Instead, they didn’t 
know the underlying substantive law—in this context, bankruptcy 
law—or why knowing the law gave them a good legal footing for 
refusing to do their clients’ inappropriate bidding. 
IV.     “WARNING SHOT” OPINIONS 
In any taxonomy, there are some opinions that defy classifi-
cation, and there are some that aren’t, strictly speaking, sanctions 
opinions.  There are even pre-opinion warnings, such as Judge 




60. Id. at 110. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 109. 
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NOTICE TO BAR REGARDING INDIVIDUAL    
CHAPTER 11 CASES  
There has been a recent spate of individual Chapter 11 cases filed by 
attorneys who have neither the experience nor the education nor 
the competence to venture into Chapter 11.  I believe that there 
are very few bankruptcy lawyers other than State Bar certified 
specialists who should be contemplating representation of Chapter 
11 debtors in possession.  
I see rampant errors being made in issues relating to cash 
collateral, conflicts of interest, and compensation. 
A Chapter 11 is not just a big Chapter 13.  If you represent a 
Chapter 11 debtor in possession, your client is the estate, not the 
debtor personally.  Failure to understand this results in serious 
liability exposure.  
Forget about trying to fix your compensation.  You will be paid 
what I allow, period.  I suggest you not spend retainers until your 
fees are allowed to avoid having to return money you have 
already spent.  
I see frequent malpractice in individual Chapter 11 cases and I 
am quick to note it on the record.  Your employment will not be 
approved unless you have substantial current malpractice 
insurance.  If you are going “bare,” don’t even think about taking a 
Chapter 11 case.63  
My guess is that Judge Jaroslovsky was tired of seeing 
incompetent lawyers make multiple missteps in cases that needed 
lawyers who were well-versed in Chapter 11 practice.  The world 
of business bankruptcy is sufficiently different from the world of 
consumer bankruptcy so that experts in one are not automatically 
experts in the other.  There is no shame in being good in one world 
but not the other.  Hubris shouldn’t tempt a lawyer into reaching 
far beyond her competency level. 
In terms of a case that doesn’t involve sanctions but does involve 
unwise behavior by professionals, you can’t beat my favorite 
“you’re on thin ice” opinion.  In In re Energy Partners, Ltd.,64 the 
court warned two investment banking firms seeking employment 
 
63. Alan Jaroslovsky, Notice to Bar Regarding Individual Chapter 11 Cases, Sept. 9, 
2009, http://www.canb.uscourts.gov/files/notice%20re%20chapter%2011.pdf. 
64. In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 409 B.R. 211 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). 
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under the more liberal 11 U.S.C. § 328 terms65 that their requested 
compensation was over-the-top greedy.66  In denying their 
application for an order approving their retention, the court began 
the opinion with an ode to the tone-deafness of the application:  
Oblivious to recent congressional and public criticism over 
executives of publicly-held corporations who are paid monumental 
salaries and bonuses despite running their companies into the 
ground, two investment banking firms now come into this Court 
requesting that they be employed under similarly outrageous terms.  
They do so because two committees in this Chapter 11 case have 
filed applications to employ these investment banking firms to 
perform valuation services even though two other independent firms 
have already performed similar valuations.  These investment 
bankers, who wish to have their fees and expenses paid out of the 
debtor’s estate, have sworn under oath that they will render services 
only if they immediately receive a nonrefundable fee aggregating 
$1.0 million.  This Court declines the opportunity to endorse such 
arrogance.  The purse is too perverse.67  
In a written opinion that reminded me of my favorite part of 
Monty Python’s Argument Clinic,68 the court reiterated its earlier 
 
65. Section 328(a) provides:  
The trustee, or a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, with the court’s 
approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional person under 
section 327 or 1103 of this title, as the case may be, on any reasonable terms and 
conditions of employment, including on a retainer, on an hourly basis, on a fixed or 
percentage fee basis, or on a contingent fee basis.  Notwithstanding such terms and 
conditions, the court may allow compensation different from the compensation 
provided under such terms and conditions after the conclusion of such employment, if 
such terms and conditions prove to have been improvident in light of developments 
not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2006).  Once a professional has been appointed under § 328, the 
bankruptcy court will find it extremely difficult to alter the terms of the professional’s 
compensation because finding that the terms and conditions of compensation were 
unforeseeably improvident is nearly impossible. 
66. In re Energy Partners, 409 B.R. at 227. 
67. Id. at 215. 
68. Argument Clinic:  
Man: Ah, Is this the right room for an argument? 
Mr Vibrating: I told you once. 
Man: No you haven’t. 
Mr Vibrating: Yes I have. 
Man: When? 
Mr Vibrating: Just now. 
Man: No you didn’t. 
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oral ruling regarding an emergency motion to employ these two 
professional firms.69  Apparently, neither of the professional firms 
was willing to take “no” for an answer.  
Here’s what the two firms wanted.  Tudor Pickering wanted  
(a) a nonrefundable advisory fee of $500,000.00 payable pursuant to 
the Court’s Procedure for Professionals Order; (b) a nonrefundable 
expert witness fee of $25,000.00 per day, payable each day that a 
Tudor Pickering Holt & Co. Securities, Inc. (Tudor Pickering) 
employee is requested, and made available, for the purpose of 
deposition or testimony; (c) a nonrefundable extended assignment 
fee of $100,000.00 per month, payable beginning September 1, 2009, 
and each month thereafter; and (d) any out-of-pocket expenses.  
According to the Tudor Pickering Application, the services Tudor 
Pickering will render to the Equity Holders’ Committee include, but 
are not limited to, the following: (a) analyzing the Debtor’s assets 
and liabilities, the valuation of the Debtor’s businesses and objecting 
to the plan of reorganization; (b) attending meetings and negotiating 
with representatives of the Debtor and creditors; (c) assisting in the 
review, analysis, and negotiation of the plan of reorganization; (d) 
appearing before this Court and other courts and protecting the 
Equity Holders’ Committee’s interests; and (e) performing all other 
necessary valuation services in this case.70  
Houlihan Lokey wanted roughly the same arrangement, minus 
the $25,000 per day witness fee, for assisting the Unsecured 
 
Mr Vibrating: Yes I did. 
Man: You didn’t[.] 
Mr Vibrating: I did! 
Man: You didn’t! 
Mr Vibrating: I’m telling you I did! 
Man: You did not!! 
Mr Vibrating: Oh, I’m sorry, just one moment.  Is this a five minute argument or the 
full half hour? 
Man: Oh, just the five minutes. 
Mr Vibrating: Ah, thank you.  Anyway, I did.  
Monty Python’s Flying Circus: Argument Clinic, available at http://orangecow.org/ 
pythonet/sketches/argument.htm (last visited May 11, 2010).  In both of the Energy 
Partners opinions, the court clearly stated, not just once but several times, that the 
requested compensation terms were simply not going to fly.  In re Energy Partners, 409 
B.R. at 215; In re Energy Partners, Ltd., No. 09-32957-H4-11, 2009 WL 2970393, at *1 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009).  The parties nonetheless went around and around, 
seeking approval anyway. 
69. In re Energy Partners, 409 B.R. at 216. 
70. Id. at 218–19 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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Noteholders’ Committee.71  In rejecting the two employment 
applications, the court noted that neither Tudor Pickering nor 
Houlihan Lokey could prove that it would provide valuation 
services that were superior in kind to other professionals, including 
other professionals who were already employed in the case at 
substantially lower fees.72 
In finding that the testimony supporting the applications was 
conclusory and self-serving, the court also pointed out the 
inappropriateness of a $25,000 per day witness fee:  
[A]side from the unreasonableness of expecting to be paid an up-
front, nonrefundable $500,000.00 fee, the Court is also extremely 
discouraged that Tudor Pickering has also requested a $25,000.00 
per day witness fee.  It is noteworthy that this fee is to be paid 
regardless of whether the witness testifies for one hour or eight 
hours, or somewhere in between.  In these dire financial times, a 
request to be paid a $25,000.00 per day witness fee out of the coffers 
of a publicly traded company in bankruptcy is not only excessive, 
but unconscionable particularly when the amount of this daily fee is 
compared to the annual compensation earned by certain Americans 
who provide arguably more essential services to society.73  
Just in case the two professional firms missed the point of the 
opinion, the court concluded with some very clear language:  
At some point, this Court must draw the line between what is 
reasonable and what is not.  To quote the Fifth Circuit: “‘[W]hen a 
pig becomes a hog it is slaughtered.’”  “As the finder of fact, the 
bankruptcy court has the primary duty to distinguish hogs from 
pigs.”  Although the Fifth Circuit expressed this sentiment under a 
different set of facts than those in the case at bar, this Court sees 
good reason why this maxim applies here with equal force.  These 
two investment banking firms have become hogs.  Indeed, the 
investment bankers in the case at bar appear to have embraced the 
outlook expressed by Michael Douglas’s character, Gordon Gekko, 
in the film Wall Street that “Greed—for lack of a better word—is 
 
71. See id. at 219 (listing the proposed fees for Tudor Pickering and Houlihan 
Lokey). 
72. Id. at 227. 
73. Id. at 230–31 (footnotes omitted).  Footnote 16 is classic, concluding with this 
line:  “The per annum salaries of the military personnel, nursing-aides, and public school 
teachers [all of whom may make $25,000 a year], compared with the requested daily fee of 
$25,000.00, speaks volumes about the level of hubris among some members of the 
investment banking community.”  In re Energy Partners, 409 B.R. at 231 n.16. 
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good.  Greed is right.  Greed works.”  That may be how Wall Street 
views the world, but it is not how this Court sees things.  In this 
Court, Greed is not good; Greed is wrong; and Greed does not 
work.  Rather, the Court refers the parties to the words of Frederick 
Douglass, a prominent and compelling figure in American history 
who knew something about hard work: “People might not get all 
they work for in this world, but they must certainly work for all they 
get.”74  
If you were on the losing end of this opinion, you would likely 
experience many emotions: anger, certainly; perhaps chagrin; 
maybe embarrassment.  But would you move the court to 
reconsider the language of the opinion?  Houlihan Lokey did,75 
and the court responded in the second round with this language:  
They are unhappy because, among other things, the Opinion 
referred to the investment bankers as greedy, arrogant hogs.  Their 
motion to amend requests this Court to unsay what it said and to 
unwrite what it wrote.  This, the Court will not do. . . .  
. . .  In this Court’s eyes, Houlihan Lokey attempted to raid the 
debtor’s coffers by suddenly swooping in and swiftly scooping out 
unseemly sums of cash from the estate.  In other words, Houlihan 
Lokey was a greedy hog.  The Court declines to amend the 
Opinion.76  
Oops.  At least, “oops” from Houlihan Lokey’s point of view.  
Perhaps the better part of valor would have been to decide not to 
file the motion for reconsideration. 
Leaving Energy Partners aside as a warning shot about 
overreaching, there’s a clear thread running through all of these 
court-initiated sanctions opinions: in these cases, the judge is so 
fed up that he or she sits down to write a detailed account of what 
the lawyer did wrong in order to provide the appellate court with a 
sufficient rationale for the opinion when the lawyer appeals. 
Consider the workload of the average bankruptcy court today.  
 
74. In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 409 B.R. 211, 237 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (alteration 
in original) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
75. In re Energy Partners, Ltd., No. 09-32957-H4-11, 2009 WL 2970393, at *1 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009). 
76. Id.  Just in case Houlihan Lokey missed the point, the court reiterated: 
“[B]ecause this Court finds Houlihan Lokey’s proposed fees to be facially exorbitant, and 
the Movants provided woefully insufficient evidence to convince this Court otherwise, the 
Court made no manifest error of fact characterizing Houlihan Lokey as greedy hogs.”  Id. 
at *10. 
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It’s insane.77  In order to sit down and write a sanctions opinion, a 
bankruptcy judge must add hours and hours of documentation and 
explanation to that already overwhelming workload.  So why do 
the judges even bother? 
In part, they do it because they’re trying to send a signal—to the 
lawyer whose conduct falls beyond the pale and to all of his 
colleagues who practice before that court—that certain behavior 
will cost the lawyer more than any perceived advantages that the 
lawyer might get from cutting those ethical corners.  They do it 
because lesser means, such as sidebars and in-chambers conver-
sations, haven’t worked to curb the behavior.  They do it because 
it’s their job to enforce the law. 
Suffice it to say that no bankruptcy judge issues a sanctions 
opinion without first thinking long and hard about all of the 
consequences.  Not only is there extra work, but because there’s 
no one designated to represent the bankruptcy court’s rationale 
for the sanctions on appeal, any judge writing a sanctions opinion 
also knows that he or she is helpless to designate the record going 
up on appeal or to argue that the sanctions order was correctly 
decided.78 
I know that every judge faces these problems—extra work and 
no representation on appeal—when writing a court-initiated 
sanctions opinion.  The problem isn’t limited to bankruptcy judges. 
One factor, though, does make the bankruptcy judge’s decision 
even more difficult: the fact that, on appeal, the reviewing court 
often doesn’t understand the sanctioned lawyer’s behavior in the 
context of normal bankruptcy law practice.79 
 
77. See, e.g., Posting of Bob Lawless to Credit Slips, http://www.creditslips.org/ 
creditslips/2008/12/bankruptcy-filings-in-2009.html (Dec. 18, 2008, 15:11 PST) (“For 2009, 
I am expecting a little under 1,400,000 bankruptcy filings [up from about 1.1 million].”); 
see also Arnold M. Knightly, Bankrupt in Nevada?  Many Are: Court Records Reveal 
Filings Jump 58.6 Percent in 2009, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 15, 2010, at D1, available at 
http://www.lvrj.com/business/bankrupt-in-nevada-many-are-81666032.html (detailing the 
dramatic increase in bankruptcy filings in Nevada and other states); AM. BANKR. INST., 
ANN. BUS. AND NON-BUS. FILINGS BY ST. (2007–09), http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AM 
Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=60253&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDispla
y.cfm  (last visited May 11, 2010) (showing an increase in total bankruptcy filings from 
2007 to 2008 in every state). 
78. See generally Greenfield v. First City Bancorporation of Tex., Inc. (In re First 
City Bancorporation of Tex., Inc.), 270 B.R. 807 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (explaining the standard 
of review for a bankruptcy opinion), aff’d, 282 F.3d 864 (5th Cir. 2002).  
79. There are, of course, times when the reviewing court does understand the 
bankruptcy court’s reason for issuing a court-initiated sanctions opinion and simply 
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V.     “I DON’T UNDERSTAND BANKRUPTCY LAW” REVERSALS 
Even when a case involves a party’s motion for sanctions, rather 
than a sua sponte sanctions order by a bankruptcy court, a district 
court can wholly miss the severity of the sanctioned lawyer’s 
behavior.  It’s clear in those situations that someone has dropped 
the ball in explaining the bankruptcy court’s reasons for sanctions 
to the district court.  Take In re Cochener.80  After the debtor’s 
first lawyer, Hawks, filed the debtor’s Chapter 7 petition, the 
Chapter 7 trustee asked Hawks for additional information after it 
appeared that the debtor’s initial schedules were incorrect and that 
the debtor may have concealed some of her assets.81  Hawks, 
feeling out of his league, affiliated a second, board-certified 
bankruptcy lawyer, Barry, to help him with the case.82  Barry 
moved to dismiss the case on June 18, 2001, alleging that “‘[n]o 
creditor in this case would suffer any legal prejudice by its 
dismissal;’ and ‘[t]he interests of the creditors and Debtor would 
be better served by the dismissal of this bankruptcy proceeding 
rather than its continuation and adjudication.’”83  Given that 
Barry was aware that the debtor may have been concealing 
assets,84 his motion to dismiss was outside the standard of care of 
a bankruptcy lawyer—and certainly outside the standard of care of 
a board-certified bankruptcy lawyer.  To make matters worse, 
Barry instructed the debtor not to attend a Section 341 meeting of 
creditors, even though the debtor’s case hadn’t yet been 
 
disagrees with the statutory underpinning used to justify the sanctions.  For example, in 
Price v. Lehtinen (In re Lehtinen), the bankruptcy court had sanctioned a debtor’s lawyer 
for, among other things, failing to show up at the debtor’s Chapter 13 confirmation 
hearing, lying to the debtor about the status of her case, and pressuring the debtor to use 
the lawyer as a real-estate broker for the sale of her home.  Price v. Lehtinen (In re 
Lehtinen), 332 B.R. 404 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 564 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3065 (U.S. 2009) (mem.). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 
Ninth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the lawyer deserved 
sanctions and was accorded due process, but the BAP remanded the case because the 
bankruptcy court had not applied the ABA standards regarding sanctions, which the BAP 
had previously adopted.  Id. at 411–17. 
80. In re Cochener, 360 B.R. 542 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Barry v. Sommers (In re Cochener), 382 B.R. 311 (S.D. Tex. 2007), rev’d per curiam, 
297 F. App’x 382 (5th Cir. 2008). 
81. Id. at 549. 
82. Id. at 550–51. 
83. Id. at 552. 
84. Id. 
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dismissed.85  Barry also instructed the debtor not to turn over 
certain documents that the Chapter 7 trustee had requested when 
Hawks was representing her.86  Even worse, Barry opposed 
another document request from the trustee in connection with a 
Rule 2004 examination of the debtor on the grounds that the 
document request sought information about possible fraudulent 
conveyances that were more than a year old and thus outside the 
trustee’s reach.87  (Any decent bankruptcy lawyer—and certainly 
a board-certified bankruptcy lawyer—would have known that 
Barry’s argument was spurious.)  Finally, in a burst of chutzpah, 
Barry sought to withdraw from the debtor’s case.88  Although the 
bankruptcy court allowed the withdrawal, it was clear that the 
withdrawal was to be “‘without prejudice to any claims, ethical or 
otherwise, held by the [Chapter] 7 trustee.’”89  Eventually, the 
trustee was able to recover just over $90,000 from the debtor and 
her relatives because of the fraudulent transfers.90  In a fit of 
pique, the debtor also ruined some real property that belonged to 
the estate.91 
After a variety of other activities in the case (not relevant to the 
sanctions issue), the trustee moved for sanctions against Barry,92 
and the court awarded sanctions under its inherent powers 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105 and under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (vexatious 
litigation).93  If one were to poll a random grouping of 
knowledgeable bankruptcy lawyers, my guess is that 100 percent of 
them would conclude that Barry’s behavior in the case was 
shockingly bad.  
The district court, however, would (and did) disagree, finding 
in part that:  
 
85. In re Cochener, 360 B.R. at 552. 
86. Id. at 554. 
87. Id. at 555. 
88. Id. at 556. 
89. Id. at 557. 
90. In re Cochener, 360 B.R. 542, 560 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Barry v. Sommers (In re Cochener), 382 B.R. 311 (S.D. Tex. 2007), rev’d per 
curiam, 297 F. App’x 382 (5th Cir. 2008). 
91. See id. at 563 (laying out the destruction of the trustee’s real property after the 
debtor moved out). 
92. Id. at 564–65.  By this time, other bankruptcy judges in the Southern District of 
Texas had already sanctioned Barry for his misbehavior in other cases.  Id. at 565–66.  The 
court in Cochener took judicial notice of these other sanctions.  Id. 
93. In re Cochener, 360 B.R.  at 586. 
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Although willful misrepresentation of the facts and/or the law in a 
submission to the court constitutes bad faith, the Bankruptcy Court 
failed to cite any law or evidence from which it could plausibly have 
found that the two statements it characterized as “blatantly false” 
misstated the law or the facts, or represented anything other than a 
good faith attempt to dismiss a case that even the trustee’s attorney 
agreed should not have been filed.94  
The district court just couldn’t have been more wrong, on a 
variety of grounds, regarding Barry’s behavior.  The district court 
judge who wrote the opinion is extremely intelligent, so it’s 
difficult to figure out the disconnect between what the bankruptcy 
court thought of the misconduct and what the district court 
thought of it.  The denouement of the case?  In a per curiam 
opinion, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and affirmed 
the bankruptcy court.95  Lesson?  If the briefing on appeal doesn’t 
put the behavior of the sanctioned bankruptcy lawyer into context, 
a non-bankruptcy-trained judge may not understand why the 
behavior merited sanctions.  That failure to understand, in turn, 
may allow serial misbehavior to go unchecked. 
VI.     “WHAT THE HEY?” REVERSALS 
There is another category of reversals: those that defy 
understanding.  I call these the “what the hey?” reversals.  Where 
the reversing court’s explanation of its reasoning is so lacking that 
it provides zero guidance as to the reversing court’s reasoning, 
then those reversals have to fall within the “what the hey?” 
category. 
Take the case of Rossana v. Momot (In re Rossana).96  Beller, 
the attorney sanctioned in the case, originally represented one of 
the Rossanas in a civil lawsuit against a lawyer named Momot, 
involving ownership of a bar, as well as in the criminal action when 
 
94. Barry v. Sommers (In re Cochener), 382 B.R. 311, 332 (S.D. Tex. 2007), rev’g In 
re Cochener, 360 B.R. 542 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), rev’d per curiam, 297 F. App’x 382 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
95. Sommers v. Barry (In re Cochener), 297 F. App’x 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2008) (per 
curiam).  In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the importance of “enforc[ing] the 
integrity of the process by policing the accuracy of debtors’ schedules and representations 
to the court.”  Id. 
96. Rossana v. Momot (In re Rossana), 395 B.R. 697 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2008), rev’d in 
an unpublished opinion sub. nom., Beller v. Momot, No. 2:08-CV-1139-RCJ-PAL (D. Nev. 
Sept. 3, 2009) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal). 
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Mr. Rossana was charged with assault on Mr. Momot after Mr. 
Momot had won the civil suit.97  Beller eventually became the 
bankruptcy lawyer for Mr. and Mrs. Rossana.98  As part of the 
Rossanas’ bankruptcy case, Beller filed a complaint against 
Momot for having executed on too much of the Rossanas’ 
property to satisfy the civil judgment.99  Beller won the over-
execution complaint, and in 2003, he garnished Momot’s bank 
account to satisfy the judgment.100  In 2007, without withdrawing 
from the Rossanas’ representation,101 Beller moved to set aside 
that same judgment on behalf of Momot.102 
It’s safe to say that Beller’s actions were clearly wrong under 
either the rule involving conflicts of interest with current clients103 
or the rule involving conflicts with former clients.104  It’s even safe 
to say that law students, when faced with a similar fact pattern in 
their basic Professional Responsibility course, would understand 
how wrong Beller’s actions were.105  In sanctioning Beller with a 
public reprimand and a referral to Nevada’s disciplinary counsel, 
the court reasoned:  
[T]hat this [was] an egregious violation of the Nevada Rules of 
Professional Conduct that [fell] outside all accepted norms of the 
legal profession.  Indeed, Beller’s conduct discredit[ed] the work of 
all attorneys before this court and in the state of Nevada by calling 
into question whether attorneys will faithfully and loyally serve the 
interests of their clients.106 
 
97. Id. at 699. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 699–700. 
100. Id. at 700. 
101. Not that withdrawal would have mattered.  Beller could never have represented 
Momot on the Rossanas’ judgment under Nevada’s version of Model Rule 1.9, which 
provides, “A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter 
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that 
person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”  NEV. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2006). 
102. Rossana, 395 B.R. at 700. 
103. See NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2006) (defining a concurrent 
conflict of interest to exist when “(1) [t]he representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client; or (2) [t]here is a significant risk that the representation of one 
or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client”). 
104. NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2006). 
105. I know that it’s safe to say that.  I’ve asked them. 
106. Rossana, 395 B.R. at 707. 
2010] COURT-INITIATED SANCTIONS OPINIONS 727 
 
 
Having read this opinion, I would have expected the district 
court to have affirmed the sanctions on appeal.  I would have been 
wrong.  In reversing the bankruptcy court’s decision, the district 
court provided this explanation of where the bankruptcy court’s 
reasoning ran aground:  
[This] Honorable Court . . . finds and concludes as follows: 
1. No act or omission on the part of Appellant Beller constitutes a 
violation of NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7; 
2. No act or omission on the part of Appellant Beller constitutes a 
violation of NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9; 
3. No act or omission on the part of Appellant Beller constitutes 
the representation, concurrent or otherwise, of parties having 
materially adverse interests; 
4. No act or omission on the part of Appellant Beller constitutes a 
conflict of interest; 
5. No act or omission on the part of Appellant Beller constitutes 
an egregious violation of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct 
that fall[s] outside all accepted norms of the legal profession; 
6. No act or omission on the part of Appellant Beller breaches any 
duty, expressed or implied, of attorney loyalty or faithfulness; and 
7. The conduct of Neil J. Beller at issue constitutes a mere 
professional courtesy and in no way, actual or potential, threatened 
harm to any represented party.107  
Ah, the old “mere professional courtesy” exception to the ethics 
rules!108  Of course that would explain what the Bankruptcy Court 
had gotten wrong—if only there were such an exception, 
anywhere, in any state’s ethics rules, let alone in Nevada’s.  If any 
opinion reversing an order for sanctions deserves the “what the 
hey?” moniker, this one does. 
There are four basic positions that the reviewing court can take 
when the sanctioned lawyer takes his case up on appeal:109 it can 
 
107. Beller v. Momot, No. 2:08-CV-1139-RCJ-PAL, at 3–4 (D. Nev. Sept. 3, 2009) 
(unpublished opinion on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal). 
108. If I were reading this paragraph aloud, I’d be impersonating Maxwell Smart’s 
voice in the Get Smart series.  If you’re old enough to remember this series, you’ll 
remember that Agent Smart would typically respond to a countermeasure by an agent of 
the archenemy CHAOS by saying, “Ah, the old [fill in the blank by describing the 
countermeasure] trick!”   Catchphrases, The Get Smart Web Page, http://www.wouldyou 
believe.com/phrases.html (last visited May 11, 2010). 
109. There are many good articles and treatises that discuss the powers of a 
bankruptcy court to sanction lawyers who practice before it.  See generally 1 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 8.07 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommers eds., 16th ed. 2009); 2 
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affirm the bankruptcy court’s decision (which leaves open the 
possibility for the sanctioned lawyer to appeal up the chain of 
reviewing courts); it can reverse the bankruptcy court’s decision on 
procedural grounds (right idea, wrong rule); it can so wholly 
misunderstand the wrongful behavior of the sanctioned 
bankruptcy lawyer (or just not care about it) that it reverses the 
bankruptcy court’s decision for completely inappropriate reasons 
(depending on whether the court misunderstands the behavior or 
just does not care, we’d have either an “I have no idea” or the 
“what the hey?” reversal); or it can, on a close call, just disagree 
with the bankruptcy court and give the benefit of the doubt to the 
sanctioned lawyer.110 
All but the first position create a disincentive for bankruptcy 
judges to even bother initiating a sanctions order in the first place.  
Maybe that disincentive is good for lawyers generally, given how 
miserable sanctions opinions can make their lives, with the 
possible disciplinary proceedings, increased malpractice premiums, 
and general embarrassment that can follow from sanctions. 
However, given the egregious nature of the misbehavior that 
triggers court-initiated sanctions, disincentives that follow from a 
misunderstanding of why the bad behavior was, in fact, bad are 
worse.  Especially when we talk about sanctioning lawyers in 
consumer bankruptcy cases—either debtor-side or creditor-side—
we’re talking about lawyers who have made real people’s lives 
miserable enough to catch the attention of the bankruptcy court.  
We’re talking about debtors’ lawyers who botch up debtors’ cases 
and deprive them of legitimate relief that the Bankruptcy Code 
can provide.  We’re also talking about creditors’ lawyers who take 
 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.02(6)(b) (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommers eds., 
16th ed. 2009); 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 8020.05 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommers eds., 15th ed. rev. 2007).  In addition, there are several useful articles that discuss 
how the appeals process works in bankruptcy cases.  See, e.g., Judith A. McKenna & 
Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
625, 626–32 (2002) (providing an executive summary and findings of a Federal Judicial 
Center study of the bankruptcy appellate process and mentioning possible areas of reform 
under discussion since 1999); Bernard Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent 
and Variation in Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 483, 492–99 (describing the bankruptcy 
appellate structure and discussing its shortcomings).  Therefore, I won’t discuss those two 
issues here. 
110. I have a sneaking suspicion that district court judges, who probably don’t see a 
lot of lawyer misbehavior in their own courts, may have a hard time believing how awful 
some lawyers appearing in bankruptcy court can be. 
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advantage of mistakes to bully people who, by definition, are 
virtually defenseless.  My guess, then, is that we don’t want to 
deter judges from ridding the system of bad lawyers. 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
As with court-initiated sanctions opinions in non-bankruptcy 
cases, no party represents the court’s reasoning on appeal.  The 
lawyer appealing the sanction designates the record; the appellate 
court reviews the case and renders a decision.  If, for example, a 
debtor’s lawyer gets sanctioned and appeals the sanction, the 
debtor himself isn’t likely to retain a lawyer to argue on appeal 
that what the debtor’s lawyer did was very, very bad.  Therefore, 
an order requiring the debtor’s lawyer to refund all fees to the 
debtor can be reversed on appeal without the appellate court 
hearing from either the bankruptcy court or the injured debtor, 
leaving the debtor himself whipsawed: bad lawyer behavior; no 
one to argue on the debtor’s behalf.  There are two injured parties 
when a lawyer’s behavior is egregiously bad: someone in the case 
has suffered actual damage, and the legal system has suffered from 
the sanctioned lawyer’s failure to live up to some minimal 
professional standards.  Perhaps the injured party will have a voice 
on appeal, but there’s an empty chair in the appellate courtroom 
for the legal system’s own representative. 
The empty chair in the appellate courtroom happens in non-
bankruptcy cases involving court-initiated sanctions, too.  Perhaps 
what the legal system needs is an amicus curiae process to help 
reviewing courts understand the standard of care in all court-
initiated sanctions cases.  Maybe we should start with court-
initiated sanctions appeals in bankruptcy cases, where the practice 
of bankruptcy law is so specialized that not every reviewing court 
can know when a lawyer’s behavior is beyond the pale. 
I like the idea of amicus briefs to help reviewing courts 
understand bankruptcy lawyer misbehavior.  But unless a lawyer 
somehow finds out about the misbehavior, I’m not sure how to 
initiate the amicus’s participation on appeal.  We wouldn’t need 
amicus briefs in every appeal.  For appeals that go to a bankruptcy 
appellate panel (BAP)—a three-judge panel composed of 
bankruptcy judges—the judges on the BAP will be all too familiar 
with the standard of care in bankruptcy cases.  However, not all 
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appeals go through a BAP; some go straight to a district court.111  
What we really need is a system for educating courts that have 
Article III judges (district courts and above).  Most Article III 
judges don’t see enough bankruptcy cases to know the difference 
between not-great behavior and downright scandalous behavior. 
Another option might be to give the Office of the United States 
Trustee112 more of a role in court-initiated sanctions appeals.113  
United States Trustees certainly have the right to appear in such 
hearings, but the U.S. Trustee system is overworked as it is, and I 
can’t imagine that many U.S. Trustees or Assistant U.S. Trustees 
would want to add this duty on a regular basis. 
A third option is for the court to appoint an expert to represent 
the court’s position on appeal.  Like the amicus option, the expert 
would likely have to do the work pro bono; there just isn’t enough 
money to go around, especially in most consumer cases, to pay an 
expert to appear in a sanctions appeal.  At least the court-
appointed expert option has the advantage of being a systematic 
way for the bankruptcy court to make sure that the reviewing 
court understands the significance of the sanctioned lawyer’s 
behavior. 
Finally, speeding up the appeals process with some sort of a fast-
track program for sanctions appeals would provide a better link 
between the lawyer’s misbehavior and the review of that 
misbehavior.  The longer the lag between the sanction and the 
finality of appeals, the more damage a bad lawyer can do to his 
clients.  A fast-track option could work because, typically, the facts 
of a sanctions opinion aren’t disputed—just the interpretation of 
those facts. 
 
111. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 5.01(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommers 
eds., 16th ed. 2009) (giving a full description of the process).  Here is the nutshell: appeals 
go to the United States district court or, if a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has been created 
and the parties haven’t opted out, to the BAP.  See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (establishing the 
appellate jurisdiction of the United States District Courts and providing that “the judicial 
council of a circuit shall establish a bankruptcy appellate panel service composed of 
bankruptcy judges . . . to hear and determine, with the consent of all the parties, appeals”). 
112. For more about the powers of the Office of the United States Trustee, see 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM, ABOUT THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE 
PROGRAM & BANKRUPTCY, http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/about_ustp.htm (last 
visited May 11, 2010). 
113. I know of at least one bankruptcy judge who, in some sanctions opinions, 
includes a request or requirement (depending on the case) that the Office of the U.S. 
Trustee appear in any appeal of the sanctions. 
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We could, of course, do nothing: leave the system as it is, 
knowing that the behavior of some execrable lawyers will 
ultimately be rewarded by persistent appeals and well-crafted 
briefs.114  If we leave the system as it is, there will still be courts 
that initiate sanctions opinions in certain circumstances.  But the 
system will stay tilted in favor of lawyers who shouldn’t be 
practicing as they do.  The unethical lawyers win twice: once by 
gaming the system in the first place, which gives them an 
advantage over the lawyers who play by the rules, and again by 
using their exploits to take clients away from lawyers who can 
promise to do only what the rules let them do.115 
In keeping with my Passover theme, I’d describe the one-
sidedness of appeals of court-initiated sanctions as akin to leaving 
the leverage all on Pharaoh’s side.  (Of course, the lawyers facing 
sanctions believe—with some justification—that all of the leverage 
is on the judge’s side, but I’m more concerned with the system’s 
one-sidedness at this point.)  When Moses kept telling Pharaoh to 
“let my people go,” Pharaoh kept coming up with all sorts of 
excuses.  None of the excuses were particularly good (at least not 
from my people’s point of view), but Pharaoh had all of the power, 
 
114. For example, see the long and storied disciplinary history of a lawyer named 
Smyth.  E.g., In re Brooks-Hamilton, 400 B.R. 238, 252 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (stating that 
the bankruptcy court found, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that Smyth’s objections were 
frivolous, implausible, and filed for an improper purpose); Smyth v. City of Oakland (In re 
Brooks-Hamilton), 329 B.R. 270, 291 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“The bankruptcy court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that Smyth had violated Rule 9011 in filing the objection 
to the city’s claim, or in imposing a sanction of a six-month suspension from practice 
before the bankruptcy courts . . . .”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 271 F. App’x 654 (9th Cir. 
2008); In re Kellander, 10 F. App’x 585, 586 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The bankruptcy court 
sanctioned Smyth for filing a frivolous 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) motion to avoid a judgment lien 
and for filing the motion for an improper purpose.”). 
115. By making it so difficult to have sanctions “stick,” what is happening to good 
lawyers is akin to what is happening to athletes who do not use steroids:  
Joe Morgan, a Hall of Famer and vice chairman of the National Baseball Hall of 
Fame, feels bad for players who didn’t use performance-enhancers.  
 “Those guys are being penalized twice,” he said. “First, the guys who did steroids 
had all those great numbers, made all the money, and the guys who didn’t do steroids 
and just had good years, didn’t make as much money.  So they get hurt there.  Now at 
the end of their careers when you have to compare those numbers to the guys who did 
do steroids, they’re going to get hurt again as far as the Hall of Fame is concerned.  So 
I can’t in my own mind excuse what happened, whatever the reason.”  
Ronald Blum, Gossage Wants Dopers Barred from Hall of Fame, YAHOO! SPORTS, Jan. 
12, 2010, http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=ap-mcgwire-doping&prov=ap&type=lg 
ns. 
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and he used that power in all sorts of bad ways: enslaving a people 
and generally acting the way that people can act when all of the 
incentives favor them (and when they are kings).  It took divine 
intervention to level the playing field.  Is it really so much to ask 
that we figure out a less-divine way to level the playing field when 
it comes to helping courts keep bad lawyers from contaminating 






116. See n.25 supra. 
